Herb Kelman visits SiT Berlin

Professor Herb Kelman of Harvard University, a social psychologist and one of the founders of Peace Psychology, honored Systems in Transition by speaking with us during his visit to Berlin on November 11, 2000. His thoughts on the present difficulties of the reconciliation process between Israelis and Palestinians taught us a great deal about that process and about the nature of reconciliation itself.
His starting-point was that the current crisis shows that a ‘cobbled-together’ peace based on a push from outside is not doable. The only realistic approach is a principled peace which addresses the basic needs and fears of the parties and is just. In other words, an agreement has to be conducive to reconciliation (which is itself both a process and the end of a process.)
On the basis of his 30 years of workshops with Israeli and Palestinian citizens, Herb could tell us that interactional styles had presaged the current deterioration over a year ago. Also, he said that the conditions for a Palestinian uprising have been in place for some time, with disappointment on the Palestinian side (both for economic reasons and because of the de facto continuing occupation) and continuing or rising tension in Israel.
Still, the question is why it all broke apart just when the two parties seemed so close to an agreement? Here, he had two answers: maybe it was not in fact as close as it seemed – and getting close can be part of the problem.
How close the process was to an agreement depended partly on perceptions of change which were basically different on the two sides. For the Israelis and the US, the question was how far Israel moved, which was indeed significant. Meanwhile, for the Palestinians the measure of change was how close the package came to what they wanted and needed. After they had agreed in 1988 to settle for 22% of their original territory, they were also humiliated by the atmosphere of ‘concessions’.
The difficulties of getting close to a final agreement have to do with the nature of the conflict, which was perceived by both sides as a zero-sum conflict about national identity and national existence. In such a conflict it can seem that if the existence of the other side is justified, I may end up having no right to exist myself, so I will try to de-legitimize and de-humanize the other.
Since the original Camp David treaty between Israel and Egypt, there has been a real process of identity negotiation. While originally both sides defined themselves on the basis of all of the territory, they can meanwhile both conceive of themselves as existing on part of the territory. Oslo was a break-through in terms of such mutual recognition.
Attitudes, however, change in particular ways. New ones are developed without letting go of the old ones, so that the context can determine which are operative. If threats reappear, the old attitudes can also re-appear.
This doesn’t mean that the old attitudes are eternal, but that they change more slowly and in different ways than a peace-process implies; they change by a process of reconciliation.
The ambivalence within a person holding conflicting attitudes is also reflected in divisions within societies, where some groups are more dedicated to the newer attitudes and others cling to older fears.
Another theoretical approach to the difficulties of a final agreement is based on Lewin’s hypothesis of the goal gradient of the approach-avoidance conflict. Both approach and avoidance can get stronger as the goal of the process approaches – but if the ‘hill to climb’ in terms of avoidance is even steeper than the forces drawing the parties toward agreement, the process is in trouble.
Here it is important to remember that losses are more powerful motivators than gains (partly because losses appear as facts while gains appear more theoretical). Here the essential issues were whether the Israelis could give up control and whether the Palestinians could give up the struggle. This was the essential risk in the process, but each also had a ‘reserve-position’: the Israelis could regain control through their troops, while the Palestinians could resume the struggle.
The ‘logic of Oslo’ had been built on Lewin’s goal gradient. The peace process had been supposed to strengthen the forces approaching peace on both sides by increasing trust, the quality of life, and security. Instead, however, the negative gradient took over, leading to the present situation. 
All of this was more important than the question of Jerusalem.
So what could be done?
Kelman said that the beginning would be to re-establish a sense of possibility that there is someone on the other side you can talk to. Then sensitivitiy to identity issues would need to be introduced.
The central question would be:
What does the other side really need in order to accept compromise?
If basic needs were acknowledged, details could be worked out in good faith.
(up to now, attention to detail has all too often replaced basic acknowledgement of the other). Negotiation of Identity may be more difficult but it is the doable thing.
Reconciliation is recognition of the identity of the other. 
The language of national narratives is essential to get there.
For instance:
‘Giving "it" (for example, Jerusalem) to them’ is not possible.
‘Seeing that "it" is essential for both of us’ is not impossible.
Discussion showed that many of the concerned Berliners present were afraid that this analysis could be overly positive in the present situation. We also discussed the hard-liners on both sides, who don’t ‘have to’ negotiate about anything because they have ‘God on their side.’ The contamination of the entire process by an increasingly non-neutral ‘mediator’ was also discussed.
Even this short summary surely reflects to readers how much we all learned from the lecture and how relevant it is to our working meeting on reconciliation next year. The depth and clarity of Professor Kelman’s thoughts were a great gift to all of us.
 

Reported by Susan Scharwiess